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BANKS-REFLECTIONS ON SOME LEGAL AND 
ECONOMIC ISSUES 
A. 0. Adede** 
The third world loans of the American banks are still the most 
controversial and most worrying part of their international business, 
even if the wilder fears expressed earlier in 1976 have been discred-
ited. Or, to put it more properly, the experience has not been good, 
but international banks seem so far to have had sound shock absorb-
ers. 
Argentina, Peru, Indonesia, Zaire and other countries have ex-
perienced difficulty in meeting their debt repayments at the proper 
time and have had to persuade their creditors either to refinance 
existing loans as they have fall en due or to agree to stretch-outs of 
the original payment schedules. 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. The Scope of the Article 
The theme of this symposium is refinancing the Third World 
debt. The symposium is restricted to a discussion ofloans made by 
foreign commercial banks. Thus, it does not deal with the general 
question of international lending to developing countries, the sub-
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Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; LL.B. Boston University School of Law (1971). 
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Currently of the Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations Secretariat, New York. The views 
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1. Third World Risks, Joust for Supremacy: A Survey of American Financial Institu-
tions, EcoNOMIST, Jan. 22, 1977, at survey 25 (the survey is separately paginated and begins 
after page 56) (emphasis added). It was recently observed that "American banks have loaned 
almost $50 billion to less developed countries. With the increased price of oil, these countries 
are running larger deficits than the bankers expected." Bailing Out Our Banks Abroad, N.Y. 
Times, March 6, 1977, § 4 (Week in Review) at 16, col. 1. 
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ject of a symposium elsewhere.2 Also excluded from discussion at 
this symposium is the question of the official development assis-
tance loans given by the governments of capital-exporting nations 
and those given by international institutions such as the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development (IBRD). Nevertheless, some observa-
tions must be made at the outset regarding the entire debt problem 
facing the developing countries and the actions suggested to deal 
with the problem, especially the suggestions that have come from 
within the United Nations. 
B. The United Nations and the Debts of the Developing Countries 
At its Seventh Special Session, the General Assembly of the 
United Nations addressed itself to the debt-servicing problems of 
the developing countries as follows: 
The burden of debt on developing countries is increasing to a 
point where the import capacity as well as reserves have come under 
serious strain. At its fourth session the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development shall consider the need for, and the 
possibility of, convening as soon as possible a conference of major 
donor, creditor and debtor countries to devise ways and means to 
mitigate this burden, taking into account the development needs of 
developing countries, with special attention to the plight of the most 
seriously affected countries .... 3 
Prior to its fourth session,4 the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) had embarked on a study of 
the debt problem of the developing countries. The Ad hoc Group of 
Governmental Experts on Debt Problems of Developing Countries 
was created by resolution of UNCTAD's Committee on Invisibles 
and Financing Related to Trade 
to consider inter alia the debt problems of developing countries and 
the various possible international measures to be taken and to study 
the factors affecting the future levels of debt-servicing obligations 
in country situations without suggesting measures with regard to 
renegotiation of the debt of individual countries and measures 
2. Symposium-International Lending: The Case for Developing Nations, 7 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT'L L. 551 (1974). 
3. G.A. Res. 3362, 29 U.N. GAOR, Seventh Special Session, Supp. (No. 1) 5, U.N. Doc. 
N10301 (1975). 
4. The fourth session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
Board (UNCTAD IV) was held in Nairobi, Kenya, in May and June of 1976. 
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which could be taken to keep external debt-servicing obligations 
within manageable levels with the object of avoiding debt crises and 
consequent harm to the developmental objectives of the developing 
countries. The resolution further stated that the Group should deal 
with these problems in a manner that would safeguard both the 
legitimate interests of the creditors and the developmental objec-
tives of the debtor countries, and have regard also to the fact that 
debt problems differ from country to country and that solutions 
should be adapted to specific conditions.5 
In its report, the Ad hoc Group, in conformity with its mandate, 
discussed the economic context in which the significance of debt-
servicing payments is to be evaluated, 6 the question of avoiding 
debt-servicing difficulties,7 and suggested certain remedial mea-
sures.R By the time UNCTAD IV was convened in 1976, the develop-
ing countries' current account deficits had shot from $9 billion in 
1973, to $28 billion in 1974, and to more than $35 billion in 1975.9 It 
was predicted that the total debt, as opposed to current account 
deficits, would be in the neighborhood of $180-190 billion by 1976,10 
and that the level would continue to increase. 11 
The primary purposes for such heavy borrowing by the develop-
ing countries were taking care of balance of payments problems, 
investment, procuring working capital and meeting unexpected or 
disruptive situations. The above cited figures refer to debts, includ-
ing public loans from capital-exporting states, loans from the IMF 
and the IBRD, and also loans from the international commercial 
banks. The developing countries at UNCTAD IV pressed for the 
following solutions: (1) waiver or cancellation of official debts (prin-
cipal and the related debt-servicing payments) with respect to the 
most seriously affected countries; (2) debt relief, in the form of 
conversion of official debts into grants with respect to the least 
developed among the developing countries; (3) consolidation of 
5. Debt Problems of Developing Countries, Report of the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental 
Experts on its Third Session, (Aug. 5, 1975) (mimeo only) 2, U.N. Doc. TD/B/545 (1975). 
6. Id. (Agenda Item 3) at 5-9. 
7. Id. (Agenda Item 4) at 10-13. 
8. Id. (Agenda Item 5) at 14-16. For further discussion, see Corea, The Debt Problem of 
Developing Countries, 9 J. DEV. PLAN. 53 (1976). 
9 . Shapiro, Monitoring: Are the Banks Biting Off More Than They Can Chew? 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Oct., 1976, at 140, 141. 
10. Pakenham, The Debts of Less Developed Countries-The Challenge for Commercial 
Ranks, J. CoM. BANK LENDING, May, 1976, at 19. 
11. For further discussion on the future debt levels, see The Poor World's Debt, 
ECONOMIST, Oct. 2, 1976, at 78. 
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commercial debt of certain countries interested in this approach, 
and rescheduling of payments; ( 4) the establishment of an ad hoc 
international fund to refinance, at a commercial interest rate but 
with maturities of around 15 years; and (5) the convening of a 
debtor-creditor conference to deal with general principles that 
would guide the renegotiation of both official and commercial 
debts. 12 
The industrialized countries which attended UNCTAD IV 
found it difficult to accept these suggestions. Nevertheless, the de-
veloping countries' representatives at the Paris North/South dia-
logue have continued to press for them. 13 
C. The Case Against a Generalized Approach to the Debt 
Problems of Developing Countries 
It should be observed at the outset that the developing coun-
tries whose debt problems are being discussed herein are those 
which are now being designated as non-oil developing countries. 
However, non-oil developing countries should not be lumped to-
gether into one group when proposing solutions to their debt prob-
lems. The UNCTAD study supports this view in the context of debt 
renegotiation procedures. 14 Economists have unequivocally stated 
that the deficit problems of the non-oil developing countries are "so 
12. Money and Finance and Transfer of Real Resources for Development, International 
Financial Co-operation for Development, Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat [UNCTAD 
NJ (May 5, 1976) (mimeo only) 16-19, U.N. Doc. TD/188 (1975). For further discussion, see 
The Poor World's Debt, supra note 11, at 78-79. 
13. For a discussion of the issues raised in the Paris Conference on International Eco-
nomic Co-operation, see Smith, Changing Configurations of Power in North-South Relations 
Since 1945, 31 INT'L ORGANIZATION 1 (1977). 
14. The UNCTAD study agreed that 
there is some merit in the view that it is not possible to establish general criteria for 
debt relief applicable to all countries and that debt problems should be treated on 
an individual case-by-case basis since these problems reflect external or internal 
conditions peculiar to particular developing countries. 
Money and Finance and Transfer of Real Resources for Development, IRternational Financial 
Co-operation for Development, Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat [UNCTAD IV] (May 
5, 1976) (mimeo only) 17, U.N. Doc. TD/188 (1975). However, the study concluded that the 
current debt problems of developing countries 
are not the result of specific external circumstances peculiar to particular countries, 
nor do they reflect mismanagement on the part of those countries. The problem has 
clearly a more general dimension since it springs from maladjustment in the world 
economy and is beyond the ability of developing countries to control. 
Id. The case-by-case negotiation of developing countries' debt was one of the specific mea-
sures suggested in Part Il of Resolution 3202 of the Sixth Special Session of the General 
Assembly. G.A. Res. 3202(h), 29 U.N. GAOR, Sixth Special Session, Supp. (No. 1) 8, U.N. 
Doc. N9559 (1974). 
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different that a blanket solution could be counterproductive." 15 
Treating the non-oil developing countries as a homogeneous 
group is, indeed, a mistake. In the context of a discussion of their 
debt problems, the non-oil developing countries fall into several 
groups, so designated for various reasons. 
In one group, for example, belong the significant debtors such 
as Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Peru, the Phillippines, South Korea, 
and Taiwan, all of whom have heavily borrowed from foreign com-
mercial banks and whose total debt, in 1975, exceeded by fifty per 
cent the entire current-account deficit of the non-oil developing 
countries. 16 These countries are considered members of a high-
income group, as opposed to the low-income group to which Zaire 
belongs. 17 However, all of these nations, including Zaire, an equally 
heavy borrower from foreign commercial banks, belong to a group 
which bankers themselves have referred to as their "partners" and 
not simply "debtors~" It is evident, therefore, that this group of 
significant debtors, because of its active participation in the inter-
national monetary market, is different from the group of non-oil 
developing countries which have not borrowed heavily from the in-
ternational commercial banks and which have not overstretched 
their general debt commitments. 
Commenting, not on the heavy borrowing by these non-oil de-
veloping countries, but on the equally soaring loans from Western 
commercial banks to the Soviet Bloc, a Swiss banker said, "Make 
a small loan and you have created a debtor. Make a large loan and 
you have created a partner." 11' An American banker explained that 
a "very big debtor has great influence over a bank, because he can 
embarrass it, or even ruin it, by refusing to repay." 19 
Another distinction exists between non-oil developing coun-
tries. Some of the non-oil developing countries have other mineral 
industries which can be used as collateral for commercial loans. 
Other non-oil developing countries, which do not have such endow-
ments, must rely upon their ability to maintain a rate of growth 
capable of creating confidence upon which the lenders can rely. It 
15. The Poor World's Debt, supra note 11, at 79. 
16. Id. 
17. The case of Zaire is of great interest because the agreement reached to refinance its 
debts with the commercial bank lenders came about as a result of the 1976 scares about debt 
defaulting. For further discussion, see note 40 infra and accompanying text. 
18. Janssen, Debt Threat: Soviet Bloc Borrowings From the West Surge, Amid Mystery, 
Fears, Wall St. J., Feb. 22, 1977, at 20, col. 1. 
19. Id. 
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is thus usually regarded as a sign of economic and political stability 
if a non-oil developing country gets an unsecured loan from an inter-
national commercial bank. 
There is also a group of non-oil developing countries whose 
main problem is not the high costs of servicing debts. These coun-
tries, instead, are troubled with inadequate resource transfers, de-
fined as "gross disbursement of grants and loans less debt service 
payments."20 This group is clearly to be distinguished from another 
group made up of countries which have severe problems because of 
their heavy dependence upon the export of one or two commodities, 
leaving them with a limited access to the world capital market. This 
latter group is "extremely vulnerable to being squeezed out of com-
mercial borrowing altogether. " 21 
Having examined the concern of the United Nations with the 
debt problems of non-oil developing countries and the impropriety 
of a generalized approach to their problems, the remaining sections 
of this introduction will be devoted to a brief survey of the extent 
of commercial banks' involvement in this matter, the rationale be-
hind the extensive lending to the developing countries, and related 
economic issues. 
D. The Magnitude of the Foreign Commercial Banks' Loans to 
Developing Countries and the Economic Rationale 
International commercial banks have increased their lending to 
the non-oil developing countries from virtually nothing in the 1960's 
to the level of providing about 65% of the total financial needs of 
the developing countries in 1975.22 Of the $41 billion deficit of the 
non-oil developing countries in 1975, $15 billion was financed by 
private commercial banks, chiefly from the United States and the 
Euromarket commercial banks.23 There are certain problems which 
may be said to exist as a result of the current trend of commercial 
banks in becoming so involved in financing developing countries' 
balance of payments deficits. Many observers fear that commercial 
20. Money and Finance and Transfer of Real Resources for Development, International 
Financial Co-operation for Development, Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat [UNCTAD 
IV] (May 5, 1976) (mimeo only) 14 n.6, U.N. Doc. TD/188 (1975). 
21. The Poor World's Debt, supra note 11, at 78-79. 
22. focked in with the Poor, ECONOMIST, Dec. 25, 1976, at 76. 
23. The $35 billion deficit of the developing countries in 1975 was financed as follows: 
$17 billion by official development aid and private investments; $3 billion by borrowing from 
the IMF and drawing on national exchange reserves; and $15 billion by the private commer-
cial banks. Capital Flows and International Economic Development, 1976 AM. Soc'y INT'L L. 
PRoc. 80, 81. 
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banks may be compelled to monitor the economic performance of 
the developing countries to which they lend. This may result in far 
reaching political consequences involving not only the destinies of 
the commercial banks themselves, and those of their clients, but 
also the relationship between the non-oil developing country bor-
rowers and the home countries of the lending banks. Although this 
problem is considered overblown by some bankers, the following 
statement is indicative of the seriousness of this issue: 
It goes without saying that the sheer magnitude of the banks' loans 
to LDCs [less developed countries] means that bankers feel duty 
bound to make increasing demands upon the LDCs that seek their 
funds. But carrying this to its logical conclusion conjures up age-old 
fears of domination of the Poor by the Rich; of renewed Dollar 
Diplomacy by the U.S.; of exploitation of previous colonies by a host 
of Western nations-and a renewal of all the worst charges that have 
been heaped upon multinational corporations. And it's not just the 
borrowers who have such fears; some of the lenders do, too.24 
It has been legitimately asked whether private commercial 
banks, which are evidently only too willing to continue to lend to 
non-oil developing countries, 25 have the ability to manage these 
loans. The commercial banks may be compelled to undertake the 
unorthodox task of monitoring the economic performances of the 
developing countries in order to ensure conditions of repayment of 
the loans. 26 Monitoring loans, as such, has traditionally been done 
only by the IMF and the IBRD. But, recently a group of private 
commercial banks entered into a loan agreement which included a 
right to monitor the economic performance of the developing coun-
try.27 Further loans may be conditioned upon the bank finding that 
24. Shapiro, supra note 9, at 140. 
25. American Banks Take Another Trip Abroad, ECONOMIST, Nov. 20, 1976, at 131; 
Docked in with the Poor, supra note 22, at 76. 
26. For further discussion on monitoring the economic performa11ces of the developing 
countries, see notes 32-38 infra and accompanying text. For a thorough discussion of the 
IMF's monitoring of exchange rate problems, see Edwards, The Currency Exchange Rate 
Provisions of the Proposed Amended Articles of the Agreement of the International Monetary 
Fund, 70 AM. J. lNT'L L. 722, 753 (1976); Meien, The "Jamaica Agreement," International 
Monetary Reform, and the Developing Countries, 11 J. lNT'L L. & ECON. 67, 86-88 (1976). 
27. In order to negotiate a $300 million balance of payment loan from a syndicate made 
up of Bank of America, Chase Manhattan, Citicorp, Manufacturers Hanover, Morgan Guar-
anty and Wells Fargo, Peru recently agreed to a bank monitoring process as a condition to 
receiving the loan. The banks separated payment of the loan proceeds into two equal install-
ments. The second payment was contingent on Peru's satisfactory implementation of an 
economic stabilization program. Many observers voiced concern over the prospect of the 
commercial banks controlling Peru's economic destiny. One observer noted that "[t]o meet 
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the borrower has maintained an economic performance conducive 
to loan repayment. 
It is important to explore, briefly, the economic realities which 
seem to have encouraged banks to continue approving large loans 
to the non-oil developing countries, in spite of a persistent fear of 
default. 211 One explanation offered for this situation is as follows: 
Faced with a build-up of Opec deposits and a decline in loan de-
mand from traditional borrowers, ... [commercial banks] have 
been desperate to find some other outlet for their cash. They thus 
increased their net medium-term lending to the developing coun-
tries through the Euro-currency market from virtually nothing in 
the mid-1960's ... to $9.5 billion in 1975. They also increased their 
net short-term lending in the form of export credits from $1.5 billion 
in 1972 to $4 billion in 1975. By the end of 1975, private capital 
markets were providing 65% of the total financial needs of the devel-
oping countries . . . . 29 
Commenting on the $20.6 billion which the American banks 
alone are said to have loaned to the developing countries in 1976, 
the United States Commerce Department is reported to have ac-
knowledged that "the increase in foreign lending reflected weak 
domestic loan demand resulting from the recession as well as declin-
ing interest rates in the United States, which made yields available 
the bankers' terms, for example, Peru sold off its state-owned fishing fleet, devalued its 
currency, and stopped state subsidies for labor." Bailing Out Our Banks Abroad, supra note 
1. The bankers responded that the Peruvians themselves developed and implemented the 
economic program and that the banks did not dictate any such program to them. Bellivean, 
What the Peru Experiment Means, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Oct. 1976, at 145, 148. 
28. The banks have continued to make loans even though the political climates of devel-
oping countries are believed to be unstable. The following remarks are said to have been made 
by certain western economists while discussing the problems which may occur if American 
commercial banks engage in monitoring the economic performance of developing countries 
borrowers: 
"we're talking about LDCs where people don't understand banking or even markets. 
Most of the enterprises they know are run by the state or beholden to it. And their 
political leaders may be demagogues of the first order, who'd love to blame their 
economic problems on somebody. It doesn't take much to whip up the peasantry with 
stories about the House of Morgan and U.S. imperialism to explain why there's no 
food." To which another observer adds: "When the going gets tough, either they 
blame the banks or the home countries. Let's say they blame the banks. That's fine 
for the U.S. State Department, but terrible for the banks, which may end up getting 
expropriated or thrown out of the country when they need a villain." Either way, it's 
likely that if U.S. commercial banks are perceived as having put pressure on foreign 
governments, it could be a disaster for America's foreign policy. 
Shapiro, supra note 9, at 142. 
29. Locked in with the Poor, supra note 22, at 76. 
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elsewhere more attractive. "30 
The necessary analysis of the extent and the rationale behind 
the commercial banks' involvement emphasizes also that "third-
world borrowers are likely to suffer from payment deficits for years 
to come and will therefore be chronically short of foreign currency 
needed to repay."31 If this condition persists, it is clear that commer-
cial banks are assured of continued demands for loans from their 
overseas clients which have become profitable outlets ,for their 
funds. Thus, commercial banks will continue to be the alternatives 
to the IMF compensatory financing or the borrowing on the national 
tranches, for developing countries seeking loans for financing bal-
ance of payments deficits. 
E. The Sources of Loans for Financing Developing Countries' 
Balance of Payments Deficits 
With respect to the specific problem of balance of payments 
deficits, the developing countries have the choice of either ap-
proaching the IMF and borrowing on their national tranches, or 
approaching the commercial banks for the necessary loan. One must 
wonder why a developing country would prefer approaching com-
mercial banks for loans which generally carry higher interest rates 
and shorter maturity terms, instead of going to the IMF, whose 
interest rates are generally lower. Certain explanations are avail-
able. 
One reason for prefering commercial banks' loans is that certain 
developing countries may want to avoid the IMF's stringent surveil-
lance of the economic performance of the borrowing country. 32 As 
observed earlier, the commercial banks are preferable because they 
do not ordinarily wish to monitor the economic performance of their 
clients. 33 It has been observed that the developing countries resent 
the surveillance by the IMF, whose personnel are sometimes re-
garded in a developing country borrower as "police in the ghettos 
areas." The IMF supervision becomes more stringent as a country 
borrows on the later tranches. In order to measure the effects of 
lending to a given country, the IMF and other international lending 
30. Lewis, U.S. Banks Raised Foreign Lending to a Record $20.6 Billion for 1976, N.Y. 
Times, Feb. 18, 1977, § D, at 1, col. 5. 
31. Locked in with the Poor, supra note 22, at 76. Financial assistance from the oil-
exporting Arab nations may change the situation. See Saudis Pledge $1 Billion for Black 
Africa as 59-Nation Parley Starts in Cairo, N.Y. Times, March 8, 1977, at 1, col. 2. 
32. See note 26 supra. 
33. Compare, however, the case of Peru discussed in note 27, supra. 
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institutions such as the IBRD, the International Development Bank 
(IDB), the Agency for International Development (AID), and even 
the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC) are interested 
in monitoring the operational effects of the loan, 34 the technical 
effect, 35 the financial effect, 38 the economic effect, 37 and the socio-
34. The operational effect of the lending, the first critical effect which should be evalu-
ated, is analyzed by asking the following questions: 
(1) Were the loan funds spent for the purposes intended? (2) Were the appropriate 
physical and human inputs actually put into the project? (3) Was the road or plant 
actually built? Indeed, was the project actually completed? and (4) Was the project 
completed on time and within cost estimates? 
Widdicombe, The Effects of International Lending Programs in the Developing Nations, 7 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 593, 600 (1974). 
35. The technical effect of international lending deals in large part with the qualitative 
aspects of the project. Technical effect is analyzed by asking the following questions: 
(1) Was the bridge or road technically well constructed? (2) Did the project meet or 
surpass normal local technical standards? (3) Did the project set new standards of 
timing, economy or quality of work? (4) Did the project bring any new technology or 
new methods to the country? and (5) Was any such new technology of a type which 
could be applied at a reasonable cost elsewhere in the country? 
Id. at 600-01. 
36. In measuring the financial effects of international lending a banker is expected to 
be concerned mainly with this basic question: Can the borrower repay the loan as expected? 
An affirmative answer should indicate that the loan created the desired "effect" from the 
point of view of the bankers who are all afraid of defaults. Id. at 601. 
37. It is difficult to isolate and quantify the economic effect of international lending. The 
following questions can be asked to ascertain the "macro" economic effect of international 
lending: 
(1) Has international lending really stimulated domestic capital formation or has it 
been diverted into short-term consumption projects with no growth effects? (2) Has 
international lending further exacerbated the dichotomy found in most developing 
countries; that is, has it fostered the rapid development of a small modern sector of 
the economy while ignoring the larger traditional sector of the economy? (3) Has 
international lending led to a concentration of economic power and to the fostering 
of monopoly situations in the borrowing countries? (4) Has international lending led 
to an "unequal" distribution of income in the developing countries? (5) Has interna-
tional lending, with its frequent "tied" procurement conditions, meant that the 
developing countries have had to pay higher prices for the importation of capital and 
other goods? 
Id. at 603. 
The following questions can be asked in order to determine the effect at the country 
economy level, the industrial sector level, and even at the "micro" level of a single important 
firm: 
( 1) Has international lending favored transportation or industry over agriculture or 
mining? (2) Has international lending focused only on the productive sectors while 
ignoring infrastructure and the social sectors? (3) Has international lending only gone 
to the high profit, leading-edge industries such as pharmaceuticals while ignoring the 
basic industries of steel and power production? (4) Has international lending been 
concerned only with large-scale farmers while forgetting the credit problems of small 
peasant farmers? 
Id. at 603. 
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political effect. 38 Apart from the reluctance to approach the IMF 
because of the monitoring practice, certain developing countries are 
also reluctant to approach-the IMF because doing so amounts to an 
admission that the country has failed to run itself properly.39 
Other developing countries may avoid the IMF and go to com-
mercial banks, not because of a fear of the IMF's monitoring prac-
tice, or of the risk of appearing as having failed to manage them-
selves properly, but instead to demonstrate that they are capable 
of putting their houses in order. Commercial banks only lend to 
countries upon a showing of each country's ability to maintain a 
healthy economic growth, conducive to the repayment of the loans. 
A developing country may return to the banks for more loans to 
demonstrate its political and economic stability, which, in turn may 
attract foreign investment. This practice could easily lead a country 
into a serious debt problem. The country may become unavoidably 
saddled with debt-servicing problems and, as a result, overstretch 
its borrowing limits. Thus, while borrowing from the IMF may not 
38. In determining the socio-political effect of international lending, the subtlest to 
evaluate and possibly the most important aspect of the lending program, the following ques-
tions are pertinent: 
(1) Does the lending precipitate the borrowing country into a dependency position 
with regard to the lender company, country, or international public bank? (Putting 
the question in the language of the man on the street in the developing country: "Are 
foreign devils controlling our country as a result of these international loans?") In 
this regard, ownership is the key issue involved. In many developing countries loan 
capital, especially from the "official" or public sector, is considered politically neu-
tral or inoffensive because the loan, in effect, takes first claim on nothing more than 
the local portion of the project's cash flow. Equity capital from foreign sources, on 
the other hand, is considered politically biased, exploitive, or unnecessary. (2) Does 
the proposed lending program support or distort national development priorities and 
plans? (3) Does the lending involve the taking away of scarce national resources, or 
does the loan involve "foreign exploitation" of the country's national resources? (4) 
Does the lending improve the ability and the capacity of the country to feed, house 
and clothe its citizens? (5) Does the lending foster a democratic, popular-
participation government? Does it encourage positive government reaction to the 
citizen's problems? 
Id. at 604-05. 
In the socio-economic sphere, the following questions are pertinent: 
(1) What effect does the lending program have on employment and under-
employment, salary levels and working conditions? (2) Does the lending relieve con-
ditions in depressed areas, reduce rural-urban migration,· reduce income disparities 
and, generally, create higher family incomes? (3) Does the lending encourage the 
development of domestic entrepreneurs and managers? ·(4) Does the international 
lending program-public or private-spur the spirit of development and moderniza-
tion in the country? 
Id. at 605. 
39. Bellivean, supra note 27, at 146. 
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be considered ideal in all situations, the alternative of approaching 
the commercial banks is not a problem-free solution. Because of the 
legitimate desire of keeping these two options open, it is quite un-
derstandable why certain developing countries do not want to ac-
cept a generalized approach to the solution of their debt problems 
and would refrain from supporting a solution that would affect their 
credit worthiness with the commercial banks. 
F. The Case for the Participation of the Commercial Banks and 
the IMF in a Single Loan Transaction 
Actual practice seems to indicate that commercial banks have 
devised a system in which a developing country client is compelled 
to go first to the IMF for part of the loan, and then approach the 
banks for the rest. The IMF involvement is important for the banks 
in that the necessary surveillance is undertaken by the IMF. The 
treatment of Zaire's debt problem is a case in point. 
Apart from paying $34 million of the $44 million arrears in 
principal to a neutral financial agency for the purpose of repaying 
its commercial bank lenders, Zaire was also encouraged by the com-
mercial banks to apply to the IMF for the national tranches to which 
it is entitled. The IMF loan, with its stringent supervisory condi-
tions, was to bring about $96 million towards the total medium-term 
de ht of $450-500 million. 40 
The involvement of the IMF would "provide the bankers with, 
they hope, a financial traffic cop. " 41 The IMF and the other official 
lending agencies are better placed than the private commercial 
banks to push countries that have become financially over-extended 
into making changes in their national economic policies. Accord-
ingly, joint financing programs between the commercial banks and 
the other international lending institutions are entered into more 
frequently. Illustrative of this point is the case of Brazil. 
The IBRD, in 1975, made a $95 million loan to Brazil, together 
with two commercial bank loans of $55 million.42 The service pay-
40. For further discussion of the repayments of Zaire's loans and how the problem turned 
into a law suit between American commercial banks and the Export-Import Bank of the 
United States, see Attacking the Ex-Im Bank: Who Should Get Paid First?, INSTITUTIONAL 
INVESTOR, Oct. 1976, at 46-48; Banks Carry on Lending to the Poor: Zaire Refinanced, 
ECONOMIST, Nov. 20, 1976, at 99; In and Out of Court, Joust for Supremacy: A Survey of 
American Financial Institutions, ECONOMIST, Jan. 22, 1977, at survey 35 (the survey is sepa-
rately paginated and begins after page 56). 
41. Banks Carry on [_,ending to the Poor: Zaire Refinanced, supra note 40, at 99. 
42. The Poor World's Debt, supra note 11, at 78, 79. 
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ments were made due to the commercial banks and channeled 
through the IBRD. It should be noted that this type of joint financ-
ing will tend to help only the "well-off. "'3 
By turning towards various forms of co-financing programs with 
official lending agencies, commercial banks are demonstrating that 
they are as persistent in ensuring repayments as they are in their 
continued lending. Banks will continue to guard against default in 
payment situations because of the possible multiplier effect which 
could ruin their banking business." 
The commercial banks take the position that repayment of 
their loans must be given priority over the repayment of the loans 
given by governments and other public lending institutions, which 
do not pay dividends, are not responsible to the shareholders, and 
have a freer hand in the use of the public money they loan. 
II. THE LEGAL ISSUES 
A. Suggested Approach to a Loan Agreement 
The commercial banks are not loaning the non-oil developing 
countries money for meeting chroni~ debt problems as an act of 
benevolence, and therefore, the protection of the banks' interest 
should not be paramount. Commercial banks have found, in the 
non-oil developing countries, a necessary market for their surplus 
funds. Thus, they are doing business guided by the usual profit-
making motive. Accordingly, the extent of the protection of their 
rights and interests in a loan agreement must be weighed properly 
against the equally necessary protection of rights and interests of 
the developing country recipients of the loan. 
The non-oil developing countries have both short-term and 
long-term economic development problems. Borrowing funds for 
taking care of economic development problems is a task which each 
country undertakes in accordance with its particular needs. The 
expected repayment of loans on schedule may, however, be dis-
rupted because of certain unforeseen events, thus frustrating the 
achievement of the legitimate goals for which the loan was obtained. 
Problems such as this, as noted in the UNCTAD study, are the 
43. Id. Private banks seem reluctant to move into unfamiliar countries and private 
institutional lenders, said to be generally conservative, tend to be selective of their borrowers. 
Id. 
44. For further discussion on the question of default generally, see Greene, Financing 
Foreign Governments and Official Entities, in Orr SHORE LENDING Bv U.S. COMMERCIAL 
BANKS 187, 206 (F. Mathis ed. 1975). 
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result of "maladjustment in the world economy and beyond the 
ability of developing countries control. "45 The interest of the devel-
oping country borrower in fulfilling the original legitimate economic 
development goal ought to be fully protected by ensuring that the 
terms of the loan agreement are flexible enough to take such reali-
ties into account. 
It is easily seen why, in loan renegotiation, avoiding default 
situations becomes a crucial issue. Both the lenders and the borrow-
ers have an interest in avoiding defaults in loan payments. The 
lenders are afraid of the possible multiplier effect of the default 
which could ruin their business. 46 The borrowing countries are afraid 
that a default will tarnish their credit worthiness in the eyes of the 
commercial banks. Care must accordingly be taken to avoid making 
a loan agreement an instrument which predominantly protects only 
the interest of the lender. Also to be avoided is the use of the loan 
agreement as an instrument on the basis of which the developing 
country borrowers remain at the mercy of constant harassment and 
humiliation by otherwise avoidable legal actions instituted by lend-
ers claiming breach of one sort or another. 
A loan agreement must create a balanced legal relationship 
between the parties in order to work for the benefit of both. It should 
not create a legal relationship which is easily made unworkable or 
which can be terminated prematurely by a party claiming the non-
fulfillment of numerous provisions cleverly skewed in its favor in 
the instrument. Banks are not to be expected to engage in what 
may plainly be called irrational and counterproductive behavior. 
Thus, they would not ordinarily insist upon a loan agreement with 
terms so harsh as to be unconscionable, or seek to terminate pre-
maturely a loan agreement even in the face of a material default by 
the borrower. It is within this basic framework that the legal issues 
regarding loan agreements are herein discussed. 
45. Money and Finance and Transfer of Real Resources for Development, International 
Financial Co-operation for Development, Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat [UNCTAD 
IV] (May 5, 1976) (mimeo only) 17, U.N. Doc. TD/188 (1975). 
46. This fear was expressed by a Brussels-based analyst commenting on the borrowings 
of the Soviet Bloc. Janssen, supra note 18, at 20. However, the chairman of Citicorp, uncon-
vinced of any multiplier effect, recently commented: 
They said floating exchange rates would dry up world trade. But they didn't. They 
said the Eurodollar market was a dangerous monster that would destroy us all unless 
tamed. But it hasn't. Now they say the developing countries will default on their 
debts and collapse the whole banking system. Well, we here say it just won't happen. 
Lewis, The Banker's Banker at Citicorp, N.Y. Times, March 6, 1977, § 3, at 5, col. 2. 
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B. Loan Agreement Between a Private Bank and a Foreign 
Government as a State Contract 
249 
Commenting on the status of the law in this field about a de-
cade ago, the Committee on the Nationalization of Property, set up 
by the American Branch of the International Law Association, made 
the following observation: 
No government would suggest that it has a legal right to breach 
a loan agreement it concludes with the International Bank for Re-
construction and Development. Can it seriously be contended that 
a government has the legal "right" to breach a loan with the Chase 
Manhattan Bank? Acceptance of the argument that the former con-
tract is intergovernmental, and consequently governed by interna-
tional law, while the latter has but one government as a party, and 
consequently is governed by municipal law, even if formalistically 
satisfying-as it is not-adds nothing to the rule of international 
law.47 
This statement was made at a time when a clear distinction was 
maintained between the status of an agreement made between a 
state and an international organization, and one made between a 
state and an alien natural or juridical ·person. The former, by virtue 
of not being made subject to any local laws, is governed by public 
international law and is labeled an international agreement. The 
latter, by virtue of being subject to the laws of either the state 
contractor or the local laws of another state chosen by the parties 
to govern the agreement, is known as a state contract. 
The question of the proper law of state contracts was the sub-
ject of a sophisticated doctrinal debate between two eminent attor-
neys, whose writings on the subject have done much in elucidating 
this area of the law. A detailed discussion of the thesis by Dr. F. A. 
Mann, that the international law remedy for state contracts is 
sounded in tort and relies upon a supervening delict independent 
and distinct from the contract ( delictual remedy), 48 or the opposing 
thesis by Professor R. Y. Jennings, that.an international law remedy 
is sounded in contract (contractual remedy), 49 is beyond the scope 
of this article. Since that debate, much has happened. It is now 
possible to suggest that the prevailing view is. that a contract be-
47. 1957-1958 AM. BRANCH INT'L L.A. PRoc. CoMM. REP. 70. 
48. Mann, State Contract and State Responsibility, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 572 (1960), 
reprinted in F. MANN, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 302 (1973). 
49. Jennings, State Contracts in International Law, 37 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 156 (1961) . 
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tween a state and a foreigner may be governed by public inter-
national law, if the parties so intend.50 
This development of the law towards the "internationalization" 
of state contracts, such as a loan agreement between a private com-
mercial bank and a foreign government, must be seen as an effort 
directed towards affording more protection for the interest of the 
alien creditors by ensuring a means of enforcing and collecting 
money through a remedy governed by a le'gal system which the 
contracting state cannot freely alter. Local laws could conceivably 
be altered to substantially change the creditors' rights. Addition-
ally, a state government might possibly repudiate the debt on solid 
or colorable grounds through domestic legislation.51 For example, 
assume a state has undertaken in a loan agreement to repay a loan 
at an interest rate of 11 %. The state might, in seeking to ease its 
internal economic problems, reduce the rate of interest in respect 
to all loans by one-half. Since the loan agreement was governed by 
the laws of that state and since that law is thus legitimately 
changed, , it would be difficult for the creditor to claim breach of 
contract if the state does not thereafter pay the original 11 % rate of 
interest. Clearly in such a case, "though common sense suggests 
that there has been a breach of contract, there is yet no breach 
according to the proper law. " 52 
The "internationalization" of state contracts so as to make 
them subject to public international law would thus prevent such 
situations from arising. Domestic legislation of a state contractor 
would not affect the international obligation assumed by the state 
because of the well-settled rule of public international law, ordained 
by the Permanent Court of International Justice, to the effect that 
no state can rely on its own legislation to limit the scope of its 
international obligation.53 However, it is still open to serious doubt 
whether, by agreeing to make a contract with a foreign company 
subject to international law, a state thereby assumes an interna-
tional obligation. The precise consequences and effects of 
"internationalization" of state contracts are still unclear and re-
50. F. MANN, About the Proper Law of Contracts Between States, in STUDIES IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 241 (1973). 
51. For a discussion of the dangers of lending to developing countries as they were 
articulated fifty years ago, see C. Hyde, The Negotiation of External Loans with Foreign 
Governments, in 1 INT'L L.A. REP. THIRTY-FIRST CONF. 349 (1923). 
52. Jennings, supra note 49, at 157. 
53. Case of the Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, [1930] P.C.I.J., ser. 
A, No. 24. 
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quire further scrutiny. 
Draftsmen have searched for appropriate applicable law 
clauses.54 Clauses which provide for third party arbitration as the 
method for settlement of disputes have also been used. 55 However, 
the designation of applicable law or the choice of a disputes settle-
ment procedure and forum does not end the drafting problems. 
There is the question of whether sovereign immunity bars all 
claims by a private lender against a sovereign state borrower, not-
withstanding the sophistication of the choice of law and forum 
clauses present in the loan agreement itself. 56 
Unlike the question of "internationalization" of state contracts, 
which commentators have thoroughly discussed, 57 the problem of 
the changing attitudes on the concept of sovereign immunity still 
requires further elucidation, especially in light of the rejection of the 
prior practice of subjecting contracts to municipal law systems.58 
The forces which have encouraged the liberalization of state con-
tracts for the purposes of protecting the legal interests of the alien 
contractor are also behind the current trend towards a relaxed view 
on the scope of sovereign immunity in the context of state contracts. 
C. New Attitudes Towards Sovereign Immunity 
The following framework for introducing international bankers 
to the risks of sovereign immunity was first announced, in 1812, by 
54. The idea championed by Professor Verdross that a contract can create its own inde-
pendent legal system, "lex contractus," which exhaustively regulates the relationship be-
tween the parties has been criticized as being "doctrinally so unattractive, so impracticable, 
so subversive of public international law, so dangerous from the point of view of legal policy 
and so unnecessary that its novelty will not cause surprise." Mann, The Proper Law of 
Contracts Concluded by International Persons, 35 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 34, 49 (1959), reprinted 
in F. MANN, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 211, 230 (1973). 
55. For more discussion of third party arbitration agreements, see Mann, State Con-
tracts and International Arbitration, 42 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 4-6 (1967), reprinted in F. 
MANN, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 256, 260-62 (1973). 
56. See generally Harfield, Legal Aspects of International Lending, in OFFSHORE LENDING 
BY U.S. COMMERCIAL BANKS 81 (F. Mathis ed. 1975); Schmidt, Legal Protection of Doans to 
Developing Country Borrowers, 7 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 575 (1974). 
57. See notes 47-56 supra and accompanying text. See generally G. DELAUME, LEGAL 
ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LENDING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FINANCING ( 1967). 
58. Reference is being made here, for example, to the initial practice followed by the 
IBRD of making loan agreements with member governments subject to the law of New York. 
This practice has now been abandoned. G. DELAUME, supra note 57, at 84-85; R. LAVALLE, LA 
BANQUE MONDIALE ET SES FILLIALES: ASPECTS JURIDIQUES ET FONCTIONNEMENT 226 (1973). The 
IBRD now effectively makes a loan agreement with a member government subject to interna-
tional law and removes it from the reach of municipal law. See 1 G. DELAUME, TRANSNATIONAL 
CONTRACTS: APPLICABLE LAW & SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES § 1.10, at 35 (1976). 
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the United States Supreme Court in Schooner Exchange v. 
M cFaddon: 59 
The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is neces-
sarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not 
imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an 
external source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the 
extent of the restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty to 
the same extent in that power which could impose such restriction. 
All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a 
nation within its own territories, must be traced up to the consent 
of the nation itself. They can flow from no other legitimate source. 
This consent may be either express or implied. In the latter 
case, it is less determinate, exposed more to the uncertainties of 
construction; but, if understood, not less obligatory. 
The world being composed of distinct sovereignties, possessing 
equal rights and equal independence, whose mutual benefit is pro-
moted by intercourse with each other, and by an interchange of 
those good offices which humanity dictates and its wants require, 
all sovereigns have consented to a relaxation in practice, in cases 
under certain peculiar circumstances, of that absolute and complete 
jurisdiction within their respective territories which sovereignty 
confers. 
This consent may, in some instances, be tested by common 
usage, and by common opinion, growing out of that usage. 
A nation would justly be considered as violating its faith, al-
though that faith might not be expressly plighted, which should 
suddenly and without previous notice, exercise its territorial powers 
in a manner not consonant to the usages and received obligations 
of the civilized world. 
This full and absolute territorial jurisdiction being alike the 
attribute of every sovereign, and being incapable of conferring extra-
territorial power, would not seem to contemplate foreign sovereigns 
nor their sovereign rights as its objects. One sovereign being in no 
respect amenable to another; and being bound by obligations of the 
highest character not to degrade the dignity of his nation, by placing 
59. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136-37 (1812). The judgment was delivered by Chief Justice 
Marshall. The Exchange, a merchant vessel expropriated by the French government and 
converted into a warship, was libeled by its former American owners while docked at the port 
of Philadelphia. The Attorney General, acting for the Department of State, filed with the 
Court a suggestion that the ship be held immune from suit. Speaking for a unanimous Court, 
Chief Justice Marshall held that warships of friendly foreign nations, in a port of the United 
States, are exempt from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States unless the execu-
tive indicates a contrary desire. Subsequently, a suggestion and a certificate of the Depart-
ment of State, to the effect that it recognizes and accepts a foreign government's claim of 
sovereign immunity, was held as binding upon United States courts. 
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himself or its sovereign rights within the jurisdiction of another, can 
be supposed to enter a foreign territory only under an express li-
cense, or in the confidence that the immunities belonging to his 
independent sovereign station, though not expressly stipulated, are 
reserved by implication, and will be extended to him. 
253 
Since first announced, this principle has influenced the devel-
opment of both British and continental jurisprudence. 80 As a result 
of this influence, capital-exporting states have adopted new atti-
tudes in their application of the principle of sovereign immunity. 
This change of attitude is based on the following fact: "As the 
economic and financial activities of the public sector expand, coun-
tries themselves have limited immunity for some operations of the 
state, so that their own citizens may enjoy legal redress."81 This 
development in the domestic sphere has spilled over into the inter-
national sphere. Today, capital-exporting states have lead the way 
in encouraging limitation of the principle of state sovereignty for the 
purpose of affording legal redress to their nationals doing business 
with foreign governments. 
Two views have been maintained with respect to this concept. 
The "absolute theory" of sovereign immunity grants to a sovereign 
state immunity from all suits. Plaintiffs are barred from instituting 
any claims in court against a foreign government on the grounds 
that the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain such a suit. The im-
munity is thus absolute, both with respect to actions in personam 
and also proceedings in rem, against a sovereign state for execution. 
The absolute theory is to be distinguished from the "restrictive 
theory" of sovereign immunity. Under the restrictive theory, a dis-
tinction is made between public acts of a state, acts jure imperii, 
and commercial activities of a state, acts jure gestionis. A sovereign 
state is entitled to immunity with respect to acts jure imperii, but 
is not entitled to immunity from suit with respect to acts jure 
gestionis. 82 Complete immunity from execution of property, never-
60. See notes 61-87 infra and accompanying text. 
61. Greene, supra note 44, at 210. 
62. In Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945), both the Department of State 
and the Supreme Court of the United States refused to recognize the claimed immunity of a 
vessel owned, but not operated, by a foreign state. In 1952, Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor 
of the Department of State, announced that the Department of State would grant certificates 
of immunity only to public or governmental acts. Such certificates would not be available 
for private or commercial acts. 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952). In 1955, the Supreme Court, 
in National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955), extended the rule to include 
the non-recognition of sovereign immunity in cases involving counterclaims limited to the 
amount of the claims and arising out of the same transaction. 
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theless, remains. 
The development of the restrictive theory of sovereign immun-
ity has become increasingly important in the context of the loan 
agreements with developing countries, since in most cases the bor-
rowers of the loans are governments themselves.63 Problems immedi-
ately arise over the question of the applicable standard for distin-
guishing acts jure imperii from acts jure gestionis. 64 The restrictive 
theory has been criticized as being too vague in respect to this 
problem. 
Various attempts have been made to delimit the application of 
sovereign immunity. These efforts can be seen in the European 
Convention on State Immunity, 65 the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act of the United States,66 and in a recent English Court decision.67 
The European Convention on State Immunity set forth the specific 
cases in which the plea of sovereign immunity would not be avail-
able. These include cases: 
(i) which the state itself initiates, albeit by way of certain counter-
claims; 
(ii) to which the state has agreed to submit; 
(iii) in which the state has taken steps relating to the merits; 
(iv) which "relate to an obligation of the state which, by virtue of 
a contract, falls to be discharged in the territory of the state of the 
forum;'' 
(v) which relate to a contract of employment to be performed in 
the state of the forum; 
(vi) which concern matters arising from the state's participation 
in a company, association or other legal entity; 
63. The same holds true with respect to East European countries which, although sub-
scribing to the theory of absolute immunity, have agreed to submit themselves to foreign 
jurisdiction by a number of bilateral agreements with the Western countries. For a discussion 
of the Eastern European cases, see Lissitzyn, Sovereign Immunity as a Norm of International 
f,aw, in TRANSNATIONAL LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PHILIP c. JESSUP 
192-93 (W. Friedmann ed. 1972). 
64. In Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. 
denied, 381 U.S . 934 (1965), a "purpose" test was recommended. Under this test, the court 
determines whether the purpose of the activity in question was commercial or public. The 
purpose test was found wanting by Congress and was therefore abandoned. See Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1976). Under the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act the test employed determines whether the true "nature" of the particular 
transaction in question is commercial or governmental. Id. 
65. 3 COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EUROPEAN CONVENTIONS AND AGREEMENTS 54 (1972), reprinted 
in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 470 (1972). For further discussion, see Mann, infra note 68; Sinclair, 
The European Convention on State Immunity, 22 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 254 (1973). 
66. 28 U .S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1976). 
67. Trendtex Trading Corp. Ltd. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, [1977] 1 All E.R. 881 (C.A.). 
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(vii) which relate to the industrial, commercial or financial activ-
ity of an office, agency or other establishment in the state of the 
forum; 
(viii) which relate to a patent or other industrial property of the 
defendant state; 
(ix) which relate to immovable property in the forum state; 
(x) which relate to property arising by way of succession, gift or 
bona vacantia; 
(xi) which relate to redress for injury caused to the person or tangi-
ble property in the state of the forum by a wrongdoer present in such 
territory at the time of the occurrence; 
(xii) which relate to arbitration pursuant to a submission in writ-
ing; 
(xiii) which concern the administration of property in which a con-
tracting state has a right or interest.88 
255 
In spite of the numerous qualifications and exceptions that exist, 
the effort is clearly to increase instances in which the plea for sover-
eign immunity would be restricted, thus opening the door for a 
greater num her of legal actions involving sovereign states or their 
entities. 
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act is a significant step for 
the United States, a country that has long adopted the restrictive 
theory of sovereign immunity. Commenting on the Act, the follow-
ing observation was made: 
The purpose of sovereign immunity in modern international law 
is . . . to promote the functioning of all governments by protecting 
a state from the burden of defending lawsuits abroad which are 
based on its public acts. However, when the foreign state enters the 
marketplace or when it acts as a private party would, there is no 
justification in the modern international law of sovereign immunity 
for allowing the foreign state to avoid the economic costs of the 
agreements it breaches or of the accidents it creates; the law should 
not permit the foreign state to shift these everyday burdens of the 
marketplace onto the shoulders of private parties.89 
The Act attempts to offer a new definition of acts jure gestionis. 
Section 1603 defines commercial activity as a regular course of com-
68. Mann, New Developments in the Law of Sovereign Immunity, 36 Moo. L. REV. 18, 
21-22 (1973) (footnotes omitted). 
69. Leigh, Department Testifies on Foreign Sovereign Immunities Bill, 74 DEP'T STATE 
BULL. 826, 828 ( 1976). For further discussion, see Atkeson, Perkins & Wyatt, H. R. 11315-The 
Revised State-Justice Bill on Foreign Sovereign Immunity: Time for Action, 70 AM. J. INT'L 
L. 298 (1976); Delaume, Public Debt and Sovereign Immunity: Some Considerations Perti-
nent to H.R. 11315, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 529 (1976). 
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mercial transaction. 70 The commercial character of an activity is 
determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or 
particular transaction, rather than by reference to its purpose.71 
Commercial activity carried on in the United States by a foreign 
state is defined as commercial activity carried on by such state and 
having substantial contact with the United States.72 
Sections 1605 and 1607 deal with exceptions to the jurisdic-
tional immunity of a foreign sovereign state, and enumerate the 
following cases in which the defense of sovereign immunity will not 
be accepted in United States courts. They include cases (i) in which 
the foreign state has waived its immunity, either explicitly or by 
implication;73 (ii) involving commercial activity carried out in the 
United States by a foreign state;74 (iii) involving an act performed 
in the United States in connection with a commercial activity of a 
foreign state elsewhere;75 (iv) involving an act performed outside the 
United States in connection with a commercial activity of a foreign 
state elsewhere, which act causes a direct effect in the United 
States;78 (v) in which the rights in property taken in violation of 
international law are in issue and that property or any property 
exchanged for such property is in the United States in connection 
with a commercial activity being carried out by a foreign state in 
the United States;77 (vi) in which rights in property in the United 
States acquired by succession or gift or rights in immovable prop-
erty situated in the United States are in issue;78 (vii) in which money 
damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or 
death, or damage or loss of property, occurring in the United States, 
having been caused by tortious acts or omissions of a foreign state 
or its agents modified by certain statutory exceptions;79 (viii) involv-
ing counterclaims arising out of an action initiated by a foreign state 
in the courts of the United States, having regard however to the 
specific instances enumerated in the statute;80 and (ix) attachment 
of property in the United States in aid of execution to satisfy a final 
70. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1976). 
71. Id. 
72. Id. § 1603(e). 
73. Id. § 1605(a)(l). 
74. Id. § 1605(a)(2). 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. § 1605 (3). 
78. Id. § 1605 (4). 
79. Id. § 1605 (5). 
80. Id. § 1607. 
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judgment against a foreign state, provided the property was being 
used by the foreign state in a "commercial activity" as defined in 
the statute, or falls within the category of property with respect to 
which defense of sovereign immunity is already denied for many of 
the reasons mentioned in (i)-(viii) above.81 
Similar to the result reached in the European Convention, the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act is designed to further limit the 
defense of sovereign immunity. Apart from providing a new stan-
dard for determining acts jure gestionis, the Act does three other 
important things. The courts are vested exclusively with jurisdic-
tion over the issue of sovereign immunity. 82 The Act contains an 
elaborate guide to the methods for obtaining personal jurisdiction 
over a foreign state defendant. It departs from the traditional Amer-
ican position by providing a remedy of execution to satisfy a final 
judgment against a foreign state. In sum, the distinction made be-
tween acts jure imperii and acts jure gestionis is now codified and 
expanded for the purposes of allowing more judicial remedies for 
Americans against foreign sovereign states. 
This new attitude towards relaxing the application of sovereign 
immunity is also reflected in Great Britain, a country which had, 
for a long time, followed the absolute theory. In 1919, the British 
Court of Appeal ruled, in the Porto Alexandre case,83 that a state-
owned trading vessel, which was in the possession of a foreign state 
at the time of its arrest, was entitled to immunity. This theory of 
absolute immunity guided the English courts until very recently. In 
1975, for example, the Court of Appeal, in Thai-Europe Tapioca 
Service Ltd. v. Pakistan, 84 held that absolute immunity, rather than 
qualified or restricted immunity, was the rule in England and Wales 
absent a declaration to the contrary by the House of Lords. How-
ever, certain Law Lords advocated the abandonment of the absolute 
theory. 
A step in that direction was taken in 1976, in Philippine Admi-
ral v. Wallem Shipping (Hong Kong) Ltd., 85 decided by the Privy 
81. Id. § 1610. 
82. Formerly, the State Department exercised some control in this area. See note 62 
supra. Professor McDowell criticized this practice as outdated. McDowell, Contemporary 
Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 817, 818 (1976) . 
See also Leigh & Sandler, Dunhill: Towards a Reconsideration of Sabbatino, 16 VA. J. INT'L 
L. 685 (1976); 3 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 77 (1976). 
83. (1920] P. 30 (C.A.). 
84. [1975] 1 W.L.R. 1485, [1975] 3 All E.R. 961 (C.A.). 
85. [1976] 2 W.L.R. 214, [1976] 1 All E.R. 78. 
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Council of the Commonwealth. The Privy Council, upon referral of 
the case from the Hong Kong Supreme Court, adopted the restric-
tive theory in holding that a state-owned merchant ship engaged in 
ordinary commercial activity was not entitled to immunity as a 
defense in an in rem proceeding. The next important British deci-
sion came in 1977, in Trendtex Trading Corporation Ltd. v. Central 
Bank of Nigeria. 86 
The plaintiffs in Trendtex were one of eighty suppliers who 
contracted in early 1975 to supply the government of Nigeria with 
a total of 20 million tons of cement. The defendant bank had pro-
vided an irrevocable letter of credit in favor of the plaintiffs for the 
total purchase price of the cement. In July of 1975, a new adminis-
tration took over in Nigeria. The new regime, faced with serious 
congestion of shipping affecting all of its ports, introduced a system 
of import controls for cement and instructed the bank to refuse 
payments for consignments which were not actually authorized 
under the newly introduced controls. 
The plaintiffs brought an action against the Central Bank of 
Nigeria claiming, inter alia, damages of $13,968,190 for the bank's 
repudiation of the irrevocable letter of credit. An injunction was 
granted to the plaintiffs ordering the bank to retain the stated sum 
or its equivalent in order to meet the claim. The bank applied for a 
discharge of the injunction and moved to set aside the proceedings 
on the ground that the bank was a department of the Nigerian state 
and thereby entitled to sovereign immunity. 
Applying the absolute theory of sovereign immunity, Justice 
Donaldson held for the bank, which he regarded as an agent of the 
government of Nigeria. 87 The Court of Appeal reversed and rein-
stated the original order, thus allowing the proceedings against the 
bank. Their Lordships found that the Central Bank of Nigeria was 
not to be regarded as a department of the state and was, therefore, 
not immune. 
Trendtex does not, however, clearly establish that England has 
adopted the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. The three 
Appeal Justices were not unanimous in their reasoning in denying 
the immunity defense. Lord Justice Stephenson, while agreeing that 
the restrictive theory is more just, was unwilling to accept it as a 
86. [197711 All E.R. 881 (C .A.). 
87. Trendtex Trading Corp. Ltd. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, [1976] 1 W.L.R. 868, [1976] 
3 All E.R. 437. 
24
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 5, No. 2 [1977], Art. 3
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol5/iss2/3
1978] Loan Agreements 259 
rule of English law until either the House of Lords or the legislature 
had so acted. 
Master of the Rolls Lord Denning was, however, more emphatic 
and decisive in his acceptance of the restrictive theory. Joined by 
Lord Justice Shaw, Lord Denning disagreed with the view adopted 
by Lord Justice Stephenson that rules of international law could 
only be considered if incorporated into English law by the decision 
of the Judges, by acts of Parliament, or by long established custom. 
In their view, the rules of international law were automatically in-
corporated into English law unless they were in conflict with an act 
of Parliament. They both urged that England should not be left 
behind in the development of new attitudes aimed towards limiting 
the application of sovereign immunity to offer more protection to 
those trading with governments or state-enterprises. The Trendtex 
decision may be said to have laid a firm ground for the abandon-
ment of absolute immunity in England. The case illustrates one 
crucial problem-who is entitled to immunity, only the govern-
ments themselves, or are their political subdivisions, instrumental-
ities, and agencies included? 
The rationale behind the trend towards relaxing the concept of 
sovereign immunity., and the metamorphosis of the internation-
alization of state contracts is clear. The two developments in this 
area of international law are aimed at affording more protection and 
ensuring effective legal remedies for the nationals of the capital-
exporting states. However, these developments are still far from the 
complete legal protection being sought. 
D. A Checklist of Crucial Loan Agreement Provisions 
The following is an illustrative checklist of the provisions which 
are found in loan agreements. The comments are offered in the 
context of a suggested approach for their use. 
1. The Purpose Clause. This clause contains a clear statement of 
the purpose or purposes for which the loan is required. 88 From the 
88. The purposes for government borrowing may include the following: 
Economic infrastructure loans, possibly self-liquidating are usually project loans 
that finance construction, expansion and modernization of airports, subways, rail-
roads, port facilities, and such sophisticated innovations as microwave and other 
telecommunications projects and atomic energy facilities. 
Economic and social infrastructure loans, not directly self-liquidating, are also 
usually project loans for such purposes as the construction, expansion and moderni-
zation of highways, sewer systems, multipurpose dams, water supply systems and 
bridges. 
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lender's viewpoint, the clause must be unambiguous so that it be-
comes easily used as a vehicle for determining the nature of the 
economic performance expected of the borrower and the economic 
effects119 of the loan itself. Thus, it is relevant in the context of what 
surveillance and supervision the lender may undertake upon the 
economic development of the borrower. From the borrower's view-
point, the purpose clause of the loan agreement must reflect the 
discretion which a sovereign state is usually allowed to exercise in 
connection with the use of its resources in the manner it deems fit 
for its national development. In this context, the purpose clause 
must be flexible enough to allow the borrower to make necessary 
adjustments in its use of the loan within the scope of its entire 
development program. Developing countries may be compelled by 
changing circumstances to make adjustments in their national eco-
nomic programs. These adjustments need not be a negative concern 
of the lender. Reasonable flexibility in the application of the loan 
is desirable for both parties. 
2. Repayment Clause. The repayment clause must be carefully 
drafted in order to protect the lender's interest in repayment. It 
General social welfare loans normally are project loans and finance construction 
of, for example, schools, health facilities and low-cost housing. 
General budget support to central government ordinarily is short-term finance 
extended in anticipation of budgetary receipts. Usually these loans will be repaid 
when the normal activities of the public sector of the country result in receipt of 
foreign exchange revenues, as from petroleum, minerals or commodity exports. De-
pending upon internal legislation or government policy in the borrowing country, this 
may be with or without attribution to a capital budget. 
Loans to create foreign exchange to finance seasonal export/import variations, 
in the early years of this type of financing, were commonly restricted to short-term 
financing of anticipated foreign exchange receipts from exports of a specific crop. 
Now, frequently, this credit is in the form of bank credit lines, reviewed annually, to 
provide for seasonal foreign exchange accommodation on the basis of the borrowing 
country's over-all foreign trade cycle. However, since the first purpose of a country's 
foreign exchange reserves is to finance just such seasonal swings, the need for this 
type of financing is prima facie evidence of concern on the part of the financial 
authorities of the country about the level of net exchange reserves or about conditions 
in the country which could adversely affect reserves. 
Reconstruction and economic development loans may be either project or pro-
gram types. Interest rates and terms are related to the borrower's needs and general 
creditworthiness. Purposes include rebuilding following natural and human disasters 
of earthquake, flood, drought and war, or to finance the elements of economic growth. 
Loans often are from public sources but frequently from private as well. They may 
be with or without subsequent attribution to specific individual projects, or they may 
finance a group of projects which collectively contribute to achievement of the pro-
gram objectives. 
Greene, supra note 44, at 189. 
89. See note 37 supra. 
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must also satisfactorily protect the borrower's interest by providing 
for some flexibility in the repayment schedule in order to avoid the 
harsh impact that unforseen problems may have on their ability to 
meet its terms. This clause should include a provision which allows 
for renegotiation of the loan repayment schedule and terms, thereby 
avoiding default situations. The inclusion of a renegotiation clause 
in a loan agreement has, however, been found undesirable by inter-
national bankers. They feel that defaults will be avoided by mutual 
trust and understanding between the lender and the borrower. Al-
though the bankers feel that renegotiation may be a distinctive 
possibility, they are unwilling to spell out the terms for renegotia-
tion at the time of the drafting of the loan agreement. 
The need for flexibility must be seen as a benefit for both the 
lender and the borrower; both should be interested in the survival 
of the money market. "Cross-defaults" clauses, "guaranty" clauses, 
and "negative pledge" clauses, usually found in the loan agreement, 
are extremes to be avoided since they represent preoccupation 
with the protection of the interest of the lender only. The proper 
approach should be to maintain the relationship between the 
borrower and the lender created out of the terms of the loan agree-
ment, and thus avoid a premature termination of this relationship 
.on technical grounds. Such a termination fails to provide necessary 
attention to the economic problems of one of the parties, usually 
that of the borrower. 
3. Applicable Law. Due to the trend towards the internation-
alization of state contracts, this question requires frank discussion 
by both of the parties to the loan agreement. This entire issue re-
volves around the problem of an adequate remedy. The lender is not 
willing to risk the value of all of the covenants, guaranties and 
securities written into the agreement by making the agreement itself 
subject to the local laws of the contracting developing states, which 
are often regarded as incapable of ensuring justice and subject to 
unpredictable alteration. The alternatives are to choose the law of 
the state of the lender; or the law of the borrower, frozen at the time 
of the conclusion of the agreement to provide a debatable "legal 
enclave" for the agreement in the event of subsequent changes in 
the law; or the laws of a third state. Alternatively, it is possible to 
make the loan contract subject to public international law, that is, 
the general principles of law recognized by the major legal systems 
of the world. 
What emerges is a complex picture, observed in the following 
statement: 
Determination of the applicable law is, in the contractual field, 
one way to accomplish this objective. Faced with the complexities 
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of conflicts rules, and subject to certain limitations of which the 
parties or their counsel should be aware at the outset, the parties to 
transnational contracts may, by clearly stipulating the law applica-
ble to the relationship between them, have the reasonable expecta-
tion that their choice will be left undisturbed. So much the more if 
the choice of law is coupled with that of an appropriate forum. A 
stipulation of applicable law may thus serve as a guide to the judge 
or the arbitrator and place the author of the stipulation in the most 
favorable position in the event of litigation. In the case of most 
contracts of adhesion and standardized forms of contracts, this last 
consideration is probably the consideration paramount. However, it 
should not be inferred from this remark that stipulations of applica-
ble law, even when they are supplemented by a choice of forum or 
an arbitration clause, are necessarily and exclusively intended to 
anticipate the judicial or arbitral outcome of contractual disputes. 
There are situations in which the parties operate in a climate of 
trust and cooperation rather than competition and have no wish to 
see their relations disturbed by unnecessary friction, least of all by 
a lawsuit. Examples are business relations of long standing con-
ducted in a spirit of good faith that the parties are anxious to main-
tain and long-term contracts closely associating the parties in the 
pursuit of long-range objectives. In this type of situation, the initial 
identification of the applicable law may remove at the outset a 
factor of potential controversy. It may enable the parties, in full 
knowledge of the legal perimeter within which they must conduct 
their relations, to seek an amicable and mutually satisfactory settle-
ment to possible disagreements between them. 
In addition to these fundamental objectives of the contractual 
choice-of-law process, stipulations of applicable law may also serve 
another purpose. Certainty or at least predictability of results re-
garding the proper law of the contract may be of little assistance to 
the parties if, the choice having been made, the content of the pro-
per law is changed to such an extent as to alter significantly the 
economy of the relationship. This consideration is of the utmost 
importance in the case of long-term contracts and will require dis-
cussion in that context. It may be relevant also in respect of ordinary 
commercial transactions, particularly in the context of currency 
fluctuations, such as those which have arisen in recent years. 
In the handling of these two aspects of the problem, the parties 
do not enjoy the same degree of autonomy. Except in special cases 
involving contracts between private persons and foreign sovereign 
and subject to the law of the sovereign contracting party where 
"stabilization" devices are sometimes used, it is generally agreed 
that the proper law chosen by the parties applies as it exists from 
time to time and not merely as it stands at the time of the contract. 
Under the circumstances, anticipating the possible impact of the 
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time element upon the content of the proper law becomes somewhat 
of a considerate guess, or more accurately risk, that must be as-
sessed at the time of contracting but with respect to which the 
parties have preciously little discretion. 110 
4. Disputes Settlement Clause. Subject to the freedom of choice 
to be exercised by the parties, settlement of disputes of a loan agree-
ment between a government and a private foreign bank may in-
creasingly result from arbitration, relying upon an arbitration agree-
ment created by the parties themselves under the contract. 91 These 
agreements govern the submission of the disputes, the constitution 
of the tribunal, the validity of the award, its enforcement, interpre-
tation, revision, annulment, the procedures to be followed, and de-
fine the applicable law.92 The International Centre for the Settle-
ment of Investment Disputes, established under the Convention on 
the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nation-
als of Other States, 93 under the auspices of the World Bank, has 
attempted to facilitate the use of arbitration in loan agreement 
disputes, 94 although certain developing countries have not yet found 
90. 1 G. DELAUME, supra note 58, at § 1.01 (footnotes omitted). The point made by 
Delaume in the quoted text.relates also to the question of the internationalization of state 
contracts by stipulating international law as the proper law. The process of internation-
alization may, nevertheless, be complicated when the parties, in the exercise of their auton-
omy, adopt the technique of "depecage" (segregation of issues), recognized in municipal 
contract law, and thereby stipulate to two or more applicable laws in a single contract. The 
parties could thus stipulate international law as the proper law but then segregate certain 
issues which, for practical reasons, must be governed by some designated system of municipal 
law. A loan agreement contemplating the issue of bonds would be a good example in which 
the validity of the main loan agreement would be governed, for example, by international law, 
while the law governing the bonds would be that of the local markets in which they are issued. 
91. The following analysis elucidates upon this point: 
In recent years the contractual character of arbitration has become recognized 
and party autonomy has conquered new grounds theretofore denied to it under the 
judicial approach to the problem. Modern statutes and treaty provisions, together 
with enlightened judicial decisions, increasingly and relentlessly have given new 
dimensions to party autonomy in an effort to cope with the needs of trasnational 
[sic] commerce and eradicate from national systems a former parochialism out of 
context with the necessities of contemporary economic and commercial relations. 
Progress, which is still in the making, has not always been smooth and the path 
travelled has often been uneven and sometimes somewhat chaotic. 
2 G. DELAUME, supra note 58, at § 13.01. This is a contradistinction to an attempt to apply 
the law of a donor country to a loan agreement. For a discussion of the loan agreement 
between Denmark and Malawi, see F. MANN, supra note 50. 
92. For further discussion, see 1 G. DELAUME, supra note 58, at 179; F. MANN, supra note 
55. 
93. Done March 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.l.A.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (opened 
for signature Aug. 27, 1965; entered into force (U.S.) Oct. 14, 1966). 
94. For further discussion, see Broches, The Convention on the Settlement of 
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it possible to submit to the jurisdiction of the Centre. However, 
private lenders still reject arbitration and prefer settlement by com-
petent local courts. Courts are regarded as better suited for the 
quick resolution of loan disputes. The ad hoc arbitral tribunals take 
considerably longer to constitute and decide the claim. 95 
Additionally, the banks seem to have adopted the view that, in 
a dispute concerning a loan, there is really nothing to arbitrate. 
Either the borrower is under the obligation to pay the loan and he 
performs accordingly, or the consequence of failure to so perform as 
stipulated in the agreement must be allowed to operate as deter-
mined by a judge in a court of law. An ad hoc arbitral tribunal, 
being an institution created by the will of the parties to the dispute 
would, in their view, tend to consider questions of equity and other 
factors that may militate against the immediate interest of the 
banks in securing performance in accordance with the terms of the 
agreement. Thus, banks would prefer settlement through proceed-
ings before a court of law. 
In this context, the issue of sovereign immunity becomes cru-
cial. Certain commercial banks in fact insist upon a sovereign im-
munity waiver clause in a loan agreement. This is usually rebuffed 
by the sovereign state borrower as an affront. Indeed, such a require-
ment is an affront. Mutual trust between the parties would make 
unnecessary such a clause. The main aim should be to find a mean-
ingful interplay between the applicable law clause and the dispute 
settlement clause in the agreement. 
5. Representations and Warranties Clauses. These clauses contain 
statements made by the borrower as to financial and other pertinent 
considerations, fixing the responsibility for the truth and accuracy 
of the statements on the borrower. 
6. Covenants Clauses. Affirmative covenants are promises by the 
borrower to perform certain actions, either automatically or at the 
request of the lender. Their principal purpose is to provide the 
lender, at the outset of the loan and during its course, with informa-
tion indicating the general credit worthiness of the borrower. Nega-
tive covenants, such as restrictions on working capital, additional 
borrowings, guarantees, dividends, and cross-default clauses have a 
basic aim of tightening the hold of the lender over the actions of the 
Investment, 136 RECUEIL DEs CouRS 330 (1972); Kahn, The Law Applicable to Foreign Invest-
ments: The Contribution of the World Bank Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes, 44 IND. L.J. 1 (1968). 
95. For further discussion, see 1 G. DELAUME, supra note 58, at 179-97. 
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borrower. Although somewhat restrictive, the extent to which these 
clauses are used in any individual case is, in practicality, a matter 
of discretion on the part of the bank. 
7. Events of Default Clauses. This section refers to the defaults 
capable of occurring and their appropriate remedies. Although the 
breaking of covenants is usually an event of default, loan agree-
ments will generally stipulate that the bank notify the borrower, 
and in certain instances allow a grace period for correction. In other 
cases, though, the clause might provide that appropriate remedial 
action is to take effect at the moment of default. 
III. CONCLUSION 
In discussing the economic and legal issues concerning the debt 
problems of the developing countries, in general, and the loan agree-
ments between such countries and foreign, private commercial 
banks, certain ideas emerge which merit consideration. The non-oil 
developing countries should not be lumped together in a discussion 
of their debt problems and suggested solutions. Levels of develop-
ment and economic potentials are important factors which distin-
guish the non-oil developing countries from each other, thereby 
demanding a case-by.-case approach. The concept of a generalized 
solution is to be avoided, except as suggested by UNCTAD. 
Additionally, available evidence indicates that many of the 
loans from the American commercial banks have gone to the non-
oil developing countries in the high-income group. These countries 
are capable of diversifying their economic structures and are able 
to take corrective measures, if necessary, to restore their balance of 
payments equilibrium. Using this as a criterion for lending, it would 
seem that the non-oil developing countries in the low-income group 
would not be customers of the commercial banks. This is, however, 
not the case. The banks appear to be so liquid that they are able to 
loan to almost any of the non-oil developing countries. A situation 
to be avoided is one in which commercial banks only lend either to 
the non-oil "rich" developing countries, or only lend to the non-oil 
"poor" developing countries exclusively. The dangers of this prac-
tice have been clearly pointed out in the UNCTAD study. 
The tendency to redirect existing aid flows to certain "poor" 
developing countries, coupled with the increasing concentration of 
private flows to resource-rich countries would have serious conse-
quences. First, a large number of developing countries would be 
excluded from such a selective "bailing-out" procedure. Secondly, 
the amounts of additional assistance that can be made available to 
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the "poor" developing countries by redistributing a given total, 
would be hardly enough to sustain current levels of income per 
capita. Thus, these countries would be condemned to perpetual pov-
erty. Thirdly, countries that may be forced to rely almost exclu-
sively on private capital might experience "immiserizing growth" 
characterized by lopsided production patterns and income distribu-
tion, by heavy external dependence, and by social instability. 
In order to counteract these alarming trends, a firm political 
commitment is required from all developed countries, and especially 
the major donors, to the objectives of financial co-operation of the 
Second United Nations Development Decade. In this context, par-
ticular emphasis should be placed on (a) the early attainment of the 
0.7 per cent target for official development assistance; and (b) the 
distribution of such assistance among developing countries on the 
basis of objective criteria including, inter alia, differences in levels 
of development; capacity usefully to absorb private flows and ser-
vice the associated debt; and the need to assure equitable distri-
bution of income.96 
The commercial bankers should reassess their willingness to 
grant loans to the non-oil developing countries on short terms and 
high rates. The money borrowed under such terms cannot easily be 
used in long-term development projects which take time to repay. 
The existing lending terms seem to encourage consumption of the 
loans in short-term activities and not in longer term projects cap-
able of enabling the borrowers to generate new export earnings to 
repay their debts. 
There is clearly a need to combine various sources of funding 
when dealing with the debt problems of developing countries. There 
should be an increase in official development loans, improved com-
pensatory financing by the IMF, including additional amounts 
under the tranches of the countries themselves and the funds from 
the commercial banks on flexible terms.117 
Two tasks lie ahead. The short-term task is to get the loans of 
the less developed countries rescheduled past the "bunching up" 
period of the next two years. Thereafter, the economies of the debt-
ridden countries must be helped to adjust to the new energy costs. 
They need not only loans but discipline, pressure and guidance. 
Private banks, even in consortium, will not have the weight. This is 
a job for governments and, above all, intergovernmental agencies. 911 
96. Money and Finance and Transfer of Real Resources for Development, International 
Financial Co-operation for Development, Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat [UNCTAD 
IVJ (May 5, 1976) (mimeo only) 23, U.N. Doc. TD/188 (1975). 
97. See generally The IMF Tries Again, ECONOMIST, March 26, 1977, at 87. 
98. Railing Out Our Banks A broad, supra note 1, at 16, col. 1. 
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There does not seem to be anything inimical in demanding disci-
pline from the developing countries if the kind of surveillance re-
quired includes an analysis of the various effects of the loan. 111' 
Practical economic considerations must be given attention in 
the loan agreements between the commercial banks and the non-oil 
developing countries. In this respect the parties should seek to cre-
ate a working relationship; mutual trust among the parties should 
be the guiding principle. 
The discussion in this paper of the debt problems of non-oil 
developing countries has included an analysis of various legal issues, 
including the "internationalization" of state contracts, the trend 
towards the acceptance of the restricted theory of sovereign immu-
nity, and the increasing call for reliance upon ad hoc or permanent 
arbitration as the mode for the settlement of disputes. All of these 
issues center on the continuing search for more effective legal pro-
tection in the interest of the lenders. This should not lead to the 
conclusion that only the lenders need have their interests protected. 
The interests of the borrowers must also be protected by including 
in the loan agreement flexible provisions allowing room for economic 
adjustment. Such provisions would lead to the avoidance of default 
situations and conditions resulting in the outcry of "Wall Street 
imperialism." 
The deliberate development of the law towards affording more 
protection for foreign private investments should not be seen as a 
phenomenon only serving the interests of western capital-exporting 
nations. With the advent of the United Nations' encouragement of 
technical cooperation among developing countries, 100 it is hoped that 
the developing countries will increasingly become capital exporters 
99. See notes 34-38 supra. 
100. To the developing countries the challenge lies in accepting TCDC (Techni-
cal Cooperation Among Developing Countries) as a new dimension for increasing and 
diversifying development activities and opportunities for developing countries which 
call for accommodation and democratic adjustment of old relations. If developing 
countries do not act now to fulfil the goals ofTCDC as a movement then an opportun-
ity for adding a new dimension to their development efforts will have been lost, and 
with it all hopes for the realization of a new economic and social environment. 
It is therefore imperative that TCDC be given immediate practical and sincere 
expression in order to focus attention and shift the vortex of development activities 
to where the action should be. 
Technical Co-operation Among Developing Countries, Study on Rules, Regulations, Proce-
dures and Practices of United Nations Development System in Recruiting Experts, Subcon-
tracting, Procuring Equipment and Providing Fellowships [U.N. Development Programme] 
(January, 1977) (mimeo only) (Agenda Item 10) i, U.N. Doc. DP/229 (1976). 
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themselves . Accordingly, the development of the law towards pro-
tecting the interests of the capital exporters will be of benefit to the 
developing countries as well. 
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